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Downward Departure Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Lack
of Self-Control as a Grounds for
Departure After
United States v. McBroom
"In a decision expected to affect future cases of its kind, a
federal appeals court has set a new standard for the 'diminished
capacity' defense by vacating the 15-month prison sentence of a
Hackensack lawyer convicted of downloading child pornography
from the Internet."1
I. Introduction
Until quite recently, under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines a criminal defendant that was convicted of a federal
crime was entitled to a departure from the applicable guidelines
only in a limited set of circumstances.2 Particularly, when a
criminal defendant sought a departure from the guidelines on the
grounds that he suffered from "diminished capacity,",3 the defen-
dant was required to prove by a preponderance of evidence 4 that:
(1) the offense was non-violent; and (2) the defendant's significant-
ly reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the
crime.5
The term "significantly reduced mental capacity" is undefined
by the sentencing guidelines and, therefore, has been the subject of
1. Jerry DeMarco, Ruling Widens "Diminished Capacity," RECORD (N.J.), Sept. 4,
1997, at A3.
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 1, pt. A, 4(b) (1995) (hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES).
3. See id. § 5K2.13, p.s.
4. See United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990) (defining preponderance of evidence as a standard
of proof whereby the degree of proof necessary to satisfy the burden of persuasion is "more
probable than not").
5. See United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990); see also McDowell, 888
F.2d at 291.
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much judicial interpretation.6 Historically, sentencing courts have
chosen to construe the standard narrowly.7 An examination of the
evolving body of case law interpreting this standard reveals that
sentencing courts consistently limited the inquiry of determining the
appropriate sentence to a criminal defendant's ability to reason or
process information at the time of the commission of the offense.8
By focusing only on the cognitive9 portion of the defendant's mens
rea,'° the courts have implicitly rejected the relevancy of the
defendant's volition" or capacity to control his or her actions at
the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding.12
Whether a defendant's volition is a factor for consideration at
the sentencing phase was neither expressly addressed in the
Sentencing Reform Act 3 nor in the legislative history preceding
the Act. 14 However, the courts' interpretation of the "significantly
reduced mental capacity" portion of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines comports with Congress' intent in promulgating the
6. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curium)
(holding that the defendant was not suffering from "significant reduced mental capacity"
since he was "able to absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the power of
reason"); see also United States v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 697, 701(4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
in order for a defendant's mental condition to be considered a "significantly reduced mental
capacity" within the meaning of § 5K2.13, p.s., the defendant must have been unable to
process information or to reason). But see United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 548 (3d
Cir. 1997) (adding a volitional prong to the standard for diminished capacity); United States
v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 706 (1997) (recognizing
that the term "mental capacity" as used in section 5K2.13 includes both a cognition and a
volition prong).
7. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 547 (disagreeing with the other circuits that construed the
"significantly reduced mental capacity" standard narrowly).
8. See Hamilton, 949 F.2d at 193; see also United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 400-
01 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In
everyday language, 'reduced mental capacity' refers to a lack of full intellectual function-
ing .... [It] comprehends both organic dysfunction and behavioral disturbances that impair
the formation of reasoned judgments.").
9. "Cognitive" is defined as "[tihe mental process of comprehension, judgment,
memory and reasoning, as opposed to emotional and volitional processes." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1990).
10. "Mens rea" is "an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or
wrongful purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty knowledge and willfulness." Id. at 985.
11. See J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL LAW § 25.03, at 295 n.2 (1987)
(defining a volitionally impaired defendant as one who knows the difference between right
and wrong, but suffers from a mental disease that impairs his capacity for self control).
12. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 546-47.
13. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-85 (West Supp.
1997), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994).
14. See S. REP. No. 98-473, at 38 (1984).
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Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.5 While applicable at
different stages of a criminal proceeding, the Sentencing Reform
Act and the Insanity Defense Reform Act were both products of
Congress' Comprehensive Crimes Control Act of 1984.16 In the
latter Act, Congress unconditionally rejected the relevance of a
defendant's capacity to control behavior to the insanity defense by
eliminating the volitional prong 7 of the defense.18  Emphasizing
the ability of the accused to appreciate the nature and quality, or
the wrongfulness, of their actions, the Insanity Defense Reform Act
of 1984,19 in effect, reaffirmed the former M'Naghten Rule.2 °
In the wake of the recent decision of United States v. Mc-
Broom,21 Congress' intent to preclude an analysis of a defendant's
volition under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines at the sentencing
phase has been called into question.22 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in McBroom departed from the overwhelming weight of
authority of the other circuit courts and adopted an expansive
definition of "significantly reduced mental capacity." This
definition includes both a cognitive aspect of the criminal defen-
dant's mens rea and a volitional aspect.23
This Comment contends that the expansive definition of
"significantly reduced mental capacity," as adopted by the Third
15. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 20, recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 17
(1994) (hereinafter IDRA).
16. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1796
(1984).
17. See DRESSLER, supra note 11.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a). Section § 17(a) provides:
"[i]t is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as
a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute a defense."
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 98-473, at 225 (1984) (stating that Congress rejected the volitional
prong because of the unreliability associated with establishing whether a defendant was
unable or unwilling to demonstrate behavioral self-control).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 17.
20. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
21. 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997).
22. See id. at 544.
23. The court stated:
"[a] person may be suffering from a 'reduced mental capacity' for the purposes of
section 5K2.13 if either: (1) the person is unable to absorb information in the usual
way or to exercise the power of reason; or (2) the person knows what he is doing
and that it is wrong but cannot control his behavior or conform it to the law"
Id. at 548. (emphasis added).
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Circuit in McBroom, will "open the floodgates, 24 to defendants
wishing to claim that they, like McBroom, felt compelled,25 to
commit a crime, albeit non-violent.26 Such an interpretation is not
what Congress intended in its comprehensive reform of the criminal
law. Conversely, such an expansion to the existing, workable
standard arguably creates a new loophole in the Sentencing
Guidelines that are already laden with exceptions. Essentially, the
Third Circuit's decision resurrects the pre-guidelines era of
discretionary sentencing.
Part II of this comment provides a general overview of the
insanity defense as it has evolved since M'Naghten's Case. The
remainder of this comment should be read in the context of the
evolution of the insanity defense that culminated in the abolition
of volition as a factor involved in the consideration of the insanity
defense. Part III briefly discusses the United States Sentencing
Guidelines that were promulgated to usurp an individual judge's
discretion in sentencing and thus provide for greater uniformity in
sentencing. Part IV addresses Congress' intention to allow for
departure from the applicable guidelines under certain limited
circumstances. Specifically, Part V describes the applicability of the
"diminished capacity" grounds for downward departure. Part VI
discusses the Third Circuit's decision in McBroom that expanded
the "diminished capacity" grounds for downward departure to
include a volitional element. Part VII analyzes the "diminished
capacity" grounds for downward departure and the over-expansive
interpretation of the Third Circuit in McBroom.
Specifically, Part VII(A) suggests that under a plain reading of
the Sentencing Reform Act, the Third Circuit was unauthorized to
alter the existing standard for "diminished capacity" and thus
should not have included an inquiry into a defendant's volition.
Part VII(B) maintains that the legislative history leading up to the
Sentencing Reform Act and the Insanity Defense Reform Act both
illustrate Congress' intention that a defendant's impaired volition
was to be excluded as a factor for consideration at all stages of the
criminal proceeding. Finally, Part VII(C) argues that relevant case
law has traditionally limited the inquiry to a defendant's cognition
24. Id. (quoting Judge Mansmann, but disagreeing with his conclusion that this new test
"will not open the floodgates").
25. See id. at 549.
26. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
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for various reasons. Taken together, the plain language of the
Sentencing Reform Act, the legislative history, and the case law
demonstrate that McBroom expanded the "diminished capacity"
standard beyond its intended meaning.
Because the Insanity Defense Reform Act and the Sentencing
Reform Act were both products of Congress' comprehensive
overhaul of the criminal law, a brief recital of the evolution of the
insanity defense provides a helpful foundation for this analysis.
II. An Overview of the Insanity Defense
At common law, the majority of American jurisdictions
adhered to the M'Naghten Rule,27 which restricted the availability
of the insanity defense to a criminal defendant who suffered .from
a defect of reason or intellect. 8  Under the M'Naghten Rule, a
criminal defendant could raise the affirmative defense29 of insanity
if that defendant suffered from a cognitive impairment.3 ° In
response to the disproportionate emphasis that the M'Naghten's
Rule placed on the cognitive aspect of the criminal defendant's
mens rea at the time of the commission of the crime,31 and in
recognition of the "irresistible impulse" test32 that was utilized in
27. See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 45 (1967). The author states
that M'Naghten's Rule provides:
[Tlhat every man is to be presumed to be sane, and... that to establish a defense
on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.
Id.
28. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1994); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "affirmative defense" as: "[Miatters asserted by defendant which, [assuming the
complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it]. Affirmative defenses in criminal cases
include insanity, intoxication, self-defense, automatism, coercion, alibi, and duress"); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.01 (justification as an affirmative defense). See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 100 (1989).
30. See supra note 9.
31. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 2 (1985).
32. See id. § 4.01 cmt. 2, n.9 (recognizing that prior to the Code, a minority of
jurisdictions had already supplemented the M'Naghten Rule with the "irresistible impulse"
test or a variation thereof); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2, at 310-11 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that the Irresistible Impulse test
is more accurately described as a test whereby the accused is not determined to be criminally
responsible if the accused suffered from a mental disease that prevented control of conduct);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at 67-68 (stating that the Irresistible Impulse test instructs jurors
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a minority of jurisdictions, the American Law Institute 3 (ALI) in
1955 pronounced an alternative to the M'Naghten Rule.34 The
ALI standard, subsequently adopted by the Model Penal Code,
exceeded the scope of M'Naghten in that it provided, in addition to
the cognitive approach, an affirmative defense for the criminal
defendant who could not "conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law."35 Thus, a criminal defendant's volitional incapacity
3 6
was recognized as an alternative basis for raising the defense of
insanity.
Reacting to the Model Penal Code's two-fold approach,37 a
majority of jurisdictions quickly followed suit in adopting either a
statutory test38 or a judicially formulated test 39 as a defense for
the criminally insane. Approximately one decade later, ten of the
twelve federal appellate courts had adopted, with minor variations,
to acquit by reason of insanity, even if the defendant knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong, if they find the defendant had a mental disease that kept him from controlling his
conduct).
33. The American Law Institute is a "[glroup of American legal scholars who are
responsible for the Restatements in the various disciplines of the law and who, jointly with
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, prepare some of the
Uniform State Laws, e.g. Uniform Commercial Code." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 82 (6th
ed. 1990).
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, history note (citing the code's pre-enactment
history: "Presented to the Institute in Tentative Draft No. 4 and considered at the May 1955
meeting. See ALI Proceeding 206-22 (1955)). Resubmitted in Proposed Final Draft No. 1
with modifications including insertion of the bracketed word "wrongfulness" after
"criminality," to indicate an option in the choice of words, and approved at the May 1961
meeting. See ALl Proceedings 314-18 (1961). Presented again to the Institute in the
Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 1962 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 226-27
(1962); see also LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 32, at 323-24; S. REP. No. 98-473 at 224 (1984)
(recognizing that prior to the Code approach, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), repudiated
both the M'Naghten and the Irresistible Impulse tests; the Durham test, as articulated and
applied, was that, "[a]n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of a mental disease or mental defect." Durham, 214 F.2d at 874. (emphasis added).
Durham was ultimately overturned by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972), and, in the interest of uniformity, the District Court for the District of Columbia
adopted the Code approach, which was accepted by all other federal courts).
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) ("A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct as a result of a mental disease or defect if he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.") (emphasis added).
36. See DRESSLER, supra note 11, at 295 n.2.
37. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
38. See id. § 4.01 cmt. 1, n.2.
39. See LAFAVE & SCOTt, supra note 32, at 312 n.6.
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the Model Penal Code test for their particular jurisdictions.4"
Significant for purposes of this comment, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted its own version of the
"capacity to conform" test in 1961.41
In 1984, Congress undertook major changes to the scope of the
federal insanity defense when it passed the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984.42 Among other things, Congress excluded
the volitional prong of the two-prong Model Penal Code ap-
proach.43 Consequently, the insanity defense was once again
limited to those who suffered "severe mental disease or defect"
44
and who were "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of [their] acts., 45 In so doing, Congress essentially
reinstated the previously extinguished M'Naghten Rule.46
Although the insanity defense and the federal sentencing
guidelines are two separate legal standards, applicable at different
stages in a criminal proceeding, the interpretation of the latter
relies, at least in part, on the former. In that context, a discussion
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines follows.
III. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
In a comprehensive transformation of the criminal law,
concurrent with the passing of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
40. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("wrongfulness"); Wade
v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 65 (9th Cir. 1970) ("wrongfulness"); Blake v. United States 407
F.2d 908, 916 (5th Cir. 1969) ("wrongfulness"); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926-
27 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1967) ("wrongfulness"); Pope v. United States, 372
F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966)
("wrongfulness"); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961) ("to appreciate the criminality of his conduct"
omitted).
41. See Currens, 290 F.2d at 774 (declining to follow M'Naghten since it was
"unworkable" and setting forth its own test: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is
alleged to have violated.").




46. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 545 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the
IDRA's emphasis on the accused's ability to appreciate the nature and quality, or the
wrongfulness of his or her actions, is a modern version of the M'Naghten Rule).
1998]
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1984,47 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.48
The Sentencing Reform Act provided for the United States
Sentencing Commission.49 The Commission was to be comprised
of a panel of seven voting and one nonvoting appointees" and
was directed to promulgate and distribute to all federal courts: (1)
guidelines for use by a sentencing court in determining the sentence
to be imposed in criminal cases,51 and (2) general policy state-
ments regarding the application of the guidelines or any aspect of
sentencing or sentence implementation in furtherance of the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 52 Additionally, the Commis-
sion was instructed to create specific offender categories.
53
Congress intended that, when taken together, the guidelines
and the categories of offenders would provide a well-defined range
of sentences that could be applied to the majority of criminal
defendants.54 Congress made the application of the sentencing
guidelines mandatory.5 5 A sentencing court was thus required to
impose the applicable sentence when the defendant's offense and
particular offender category were coordinated and fell within the
range of one of the guidelines.
56
Prior to the Act, sentencing judges enjoyed broad discretion in
imposing sentences on criminal defendants.57 As a result, often
two similarly situated individuals who engaged in identical criminal
behavior and whose criminal histories were also identical received
47. 18 U.S.C. § 17.
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-85, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1984).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
50. See id.
51. See id. § 994(a)(1).
52. See id. § 994(a)(2) (indicating that the purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), which
the Commission is required to act in furtherance of, are: deterring crime, incapacitating the
offender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the offender).
53. See id. § 994(b)(1).
54. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A.
55. See id.
56. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 93-6 (1991) (stating that
calculating a particular defendant's sentence requires an application of seven basic steps,
including the determination of whether the "departure" from the presumed range is
appropriate for the offender's assistance to law enforcement authorities or for any
aggravating or mitigating factors that were "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission"; but deeming "not ordinarily relevant," the offender's age,
education, vocational skills, mental, emotional, and physical condition, including drug and
alcohol dependence, prior employment, family ties, responsibilities or community ties).
57. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (citing Mistretta v. United States
488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)).
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vastly different sentences based solely on the courtroom in which
they were sentenced.58 In an effort to achieve a greater degree of
honesty,59 uniformity,60 and proportionality6' in imposing sen-
tences for criminal conduct, Congress mandated the formulation
and application of the guidelines. However, Congress recognized
that a bright-line rule was as equally unworkable as the no-rule
alternative, given the unlikelihood that any two situations would be
identical.62 Recognizing the difficulties associated with a strict
application of the guidelines, Congress left in place a certain
measure of discretion in allowing for departures from the applica-
ble guideline.63 Ironically, the judicial discretion that Congress
sought to curb in promulgating the United States Sentencing
Guidelines remained intact.
IV. Departure from the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Congress permitted sentencing courts to depart from the
applicable guideline range only if "the court finds that an aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described. '64  In determining whether a particular circumstance
was adequately considered by the Commission, Congress directed
courts to "consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy state-
ments, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
65
Each guideline is intended to carve out a "heartland," that is,
a set of typical cases incorporating the conduct that each guideline
58. See id.; see also S. REP. No. 98-473, at 38 (1983).
59. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 3 (explaining
that Congress sought to achieve "honesty" in sentencing; that is, that the sentence imposed
will be the sentence served thereby eliminating the judge's automatic reduction of a sentence
for a defendant's past "good time" credits and abolishing the parole system).
60. See id. (stating that Congress also sought to eliminate the inherent disparity in the
existing determinate sentencing process and thus achieve "uniformity" in the sentencing of
criminal defendants anticipating that similarly situated criminal defendants who engaged in
similar criminal behavior would receive similar sentences).
61. See id. (explaining that "proportionality" in sentencing recognizes that criminal
conduct varies in degrees of severity and thus imposes different sentences depending on the
degree of severity of the offense).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 4(b) (recognizing that despite the mandatory application of the guidelines,
Congress allowed for departures in a limited set of circumstances).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
65. Id.; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92-93 (1996).
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describes. 66 However, not all cases will neatly fall within a well-
defined category. Thus, when the court is faced with an atypical
case,67 Congress provided a limited mechanism that the courts
could utilize to consider whether the particular fact situation
warrants a departure from the applicable sentencing guideline. 8
Congress implemented the departure approach for two
reasons.69  First, the Commission recognized the impracticability
of establishing a set of universally applicable guidelines and denied
that such a duty existed.7 ° Congress empowered the Commission
to monitor the courts' application of and departure from the
guidelines and make necessary changes as the occasion arises.7
Second, the Commission believed that although courts enjoyed the
liberty to depart from the applicable guideline, such departures
would be rare because the guidelines were originally formulated in
a manner that took into account those factors that the Commis-
sion's data indicated made a significant difference in pre-guidelines
sentencing practices.
The Commission did not leave the courts adrift.73 Rather, it
provided some guidance regarding those factors that would render
a defendant's circumstances atypical and thus a candidate for
departure.74 First, the Commission mandated that certain factors
are never to be considered in justifying a departure from the
guidelines.75 These factors, though not intended to be exhaustive,
include race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic
status,7 6 lack of guidance as a youth,77 drug or alcohol depen-
dence,78 and economic hardship.79 The Commission next deter-
66. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b).
67. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94 (explaining that "atypical cases" are those that were not
"'adequately taken into consideration,' and factors that may make a case atypical provide a
potential bases for departure").
68. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b).
69. See id.; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 93-94.
70. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94.
74. See id.
75. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b).
76. See id. § 5H1.10, p.s.
77. See id. § 5H1.12, p.s.
78. See id. § 5H1.4, p.s.
79. See id. § 5H2.12, p.s.
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mined that if certain "encouraged factors''s are the basis for
departure, the Court is authorized to depart if the applicable
guideline does not already take those factors into account."1
"Diminished capacity" is one of the enumerated encouraged factors
in the guidelines. 82 A sentencing judge must, however, specify any
reasons for the departure. 3
On the contrary, there are also "discouraged factors,"' or
those that are "not ordinarily relevant to the determination of
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range." 5 If the factor is a discouraged factor, the court is autho-
rized to depart only if the presence of the discouraged factor is
exceptional in degree or the case is atypical.8 6 Mental and
emotional conditions are among those factors that are generally
considered discouraged factors and therefore are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should fall outside the
parameters of the guidelines.8 7 The defendant in McBroom
moved for a downward departure pursuant to one of the encour-
aged factors, specifically, the "diminished capacity"' factor.
V. Diminished Capacity, § 5K2.13, p.s.
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's
mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should fall outside of the guide-
lines.8 9 However, listed among the encouraged factors, a defen-
dant's "diminished capacity"9 may be considered by a sentencing
court to determine whether a particular set of circumstances
warrants a departure from the applicable guideline. Section 5K2.13
provides:
80. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) (stating that "encouraged factors"
are those factors that the Commission has been unable to fully consider in formulating the
guidelines).
81. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.0.
82. See id. § 5K2.13, p.s.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (stating that the burden is on the judge that exercises his
discretion and departs from an applicable guideline to state the reasons for the departure).
84. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95.
85. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 5, pt. H, intro. cmt.
86. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95.
87. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5H1.3, p.s.
88. See id. § 5K2.13, p.s.
89. See id. § 5H1.3, p.s.; see also United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 400 (6th Cir.
1993).
90. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.13, p.s.
1998]
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If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering
from a significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from
voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence
may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense provided
that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need
for incarceration. 91
Therefore, a criminal defendant who petitions the court for a
departure from the applicable guideline has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of evidence92 that (1) the offense for which
he was convicted was non-violent and (2) at the time of the
commission of the crime, the defendant was suffering from a
significantly reduced mental capacity.93
It is important to note that "non-violent offense" is not
specifically defined in the Sentencing Guidelines. 94 In interpreting
the "non-violent offense" standard, courts rely on two alternative
approaches.95 Some courts maintain that the definition of "crime
of violence,"" as set forth in section 4B1.2 of the career offender
provision, 97 governs the term "non-violent offense" in section
5K2.13.98 Other sentencing courts, however, consider all of the
facts and circumstances of each case in determining whether or not
the offense was "non-violent." 99 Applying both tests in McBroom,
the Third Circuit concluded that, under either test, the crime that
Kenneth McBroom was convicted of-possession of child pornogra-
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989).
93. See United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1989); see also McDowell, 888
F.2d at 291 (stating that the defendant usually bears the burden of persuasion when
attempting to justify a downward departure).
94. See United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1990).
95. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 542 (3d Cir. 1997).
96. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4B1.2(1) (providing that "[t]he term
'crime of violence' means (a) an offense that has an element of the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other
offense that is a felony and that, by nature involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense").
97. See id. § 4B1.2.
98. See United States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United States
v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Borrayo, 898 F.2d at 94; United States
v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989).
99. See United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); see also United States
v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Poff, 926 F.2d at 593-96 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
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phy-was a non-violent offense. 100  Having concluded that the
offense was non-violent, the court proceeded to analyze the second
prong of the "diminished capacity"' 01 factor.
The standard "significantly reduced mental capacity," is also
undefined by the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore is the subject
of much judicial debate. 0 2 However, since the inception of the
Sentencing Reform Act, sentencing courts have consistently
restricted their focus to the cognitive aspect of a defendant's mens
rea in interpreting the standard. 3 The overwhelming majority
of courts have concluded that in order for a defendant's mental
condition to be considered as "significantly reduced mental
capacity" within the meaning of section 5K2.13 the defendant must
have been unable to process information or to reason." Some
courts have held that in order to qualify for a departure on the
grounds of diminished capacity, the defendant must be suffering
from something greater than "emotional problems,"105 or "hard-
ship."'1°" Moreover, it is well-established that the defendant must
demonstrate a nexus between the criminal behavior and the
"significantly reduced mental capacity."1°7
Courts are reluctant to depart downward under section
5K2.13. 1°8 This practice is true even where a criminal defendant
100. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 542. In McBroom, the court explained that the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, bound by Rosen, utilized the approach that "crime of violence"
governs the definition of "non-violent offense" of § 5K2.13, but nevertheless applied the
alternative case-by-case approach. See id. at 542-43. The Court pointed out that the Third
Circuit, while sympathetic in noting that possession of child pornography is not a victimless
crime, see United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1328 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993), was satisfied that
McBroom committed a non-violent offense because there was no element of physical force
or violence, no direct contact with children in furtherance of the defendant's efforts to obtain
child pornography, no transportation or receipt of child pornography, nor any violence in fact
or threat of violence. See id. at 543.
101. See SENTENCING GUILDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.13, p.s.
102. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 544-48 (discussing the various interpretations of "signifi-
cantly reduced mental capacity").
103. See United States v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1996); see also, United
States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d
396, 400-01 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1991).
104. See Goossens, 84 F.3d at 701 (citing Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1512-13; Johnson, 979 F.2d
at 400-01; Hamilton, 949 F.2d at 193).
105. See United States v. Gentry, 925 F.2d 186, 188 (7th Cir. 1991).
106. See Johnson, 979 F.2d at 401.
107. See Goossens, 84 F.3d at 702; see also United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341,
1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
108. See Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Downward Departure Under § 5K2.13 of
United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 U.S.C.A. APPX) Permitting Downward Departure
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claims, and the court confirms through expert testimony, that he or
she exhibits borderline intelligence, close to the level of mental
retardation."° Furthermore, courts have been vocal in expressing
their apprehensions when faced with the occasion to extend the
boundaries of "diminished capacity" beyond its historical mean-
ing.11 Courts often state that the defense unnecessarily creates
an incentive for defendants and the government to hire teams of
"psychologists, social workers, and other 'mitigation special-
ists"""1 to "comb [,he defendants'] personal and family history for
evidence of adversity.""' Courts are concerned that such con-
duct, in effect, clouds the fact-finding process by turning the inquiry
into a credibility contest."3
Notwithstanding the existence of the well-established "dimin-
ished capacity" standard and the pronounced fears of the potential
consequences of an expansive test, the Third Circuit declined to
follow other circuits and instead established its own more expansive
standard of "diminished capacity" for sentencing purposes."4
Against this background, a discussion of the recent decision in
United States v. McBroom follows.
VI. United States v. McBroom
Kenneth McBroom pleaded guilty and was convicted of one
count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4), and was sentenced to fifteen to twenty-one months of
for Defendants with Significantly Reduced Mental Capacity Convicted of Nonviolent Offenses,
128 A.L.R. FED. 593 (1995) (categorizing and analyzing a collection of cases involving
downward departure under § 5K2.13).
109. See United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326, 333 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States
v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 473 (1st Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64,
66 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); cf United States v. Chambers, 885 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 1995).
110. See United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 192 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
court did not think it was authorized to depart under § 5K2.13 because it believed that the
Sentencing Commission was "talking about things such as borderline mental intelligence
capacity ... [not] about suffering from compulsive gambling"); see also United States v.
Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1996) ("If we were to approve the application of the
diminished capacity departure in this case, we would be holding that anyone who could point
to a sufficiently tragic event in his or her life would be eligible for a sentence reduction.");
Johnson, 979 F.2d at 401 ("[W]e also think it ill advised to excuse a defendant's unlawful
conduct merely because he has suffered insult or hardship and experienced frustration and
anger as a result.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d, 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 548 (3d Cir. 1997).
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incarceration." 5 In the district court, McBroom moved for a
downward departure pursuant to United States Sentencing
Guideline Section 5K2.13, p.s., contending that due to the extensive
sexual abuse he endured as a child at the hands of his father, he
suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity.116 Notwith-
standing his admitted ability to process information, to reason, and
to understand the difference between right and wrong, McBroom
maintained that he felt compelled"7 to download child pornogra-
phy from the Internet."8 His compulsion, he argued, evidenced
a lack of control over his behavior or an inability to conform to the
requirements of the law."9
Exercising its discretion as to whether McBroom's situation
warranted a downward departure from the applicable sentencing
guideline and finding that McBroom was able, at the time of the
offense, to absorb information in the usual way and to employ the
power of reason, the district court denied McBroom's motion for
a downward departure.12 ° On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the district court could have
considered the possibility that McBroom suffered from a volitional
impairment that prevented him from controlling his behavior or
conforming it to the law.'
Acknowledging that McBroom was not suffering from
"significantly reduced mental capacity" under the existing standard,
the court articulated a new, alternative standard for the criminal
defendant who petitions the court for a downward departure from
the applicable sentencing guideline. 22 The Third Circuit added
a volitional prong to the existing, workable cognitive test for
diminished capacity.123  The court then vacated the sentence
115. See id. at 537.
116. See id. at 539.
117. See id. at 534.
118. See id.
119. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 549.
120. See id. at 534.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 548.
123. See id. (setting forth the new standard that states in pertinent part: "A person may
be suffering from a reduced mental capacity for the purposes of § 5K2.13 if either ... or (2)
the person knows what he is doing and that it is wrong but cannot control his behavior or
conform it to the law").
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imposed by the district court and remanded the case for resentenc-
ing based upon the new standard set forth in its opinion.
124
On remand, following the new standard set by the Third
Circuit, the district court concluded that the incestuous childhood
experiences that McBroom endured warranted a lighter sen-
tence. 25 After considering expert testimony and the testimony of
defendant McBroom himself, the district court reduced the original
15-month sentence to six months in federal prison in addition to
three months house arrest. 2 6 In so doing, the district court set a
groundbreaking precedent.
VII. Analysis
Kenneth McBroom was undeniably the victim of a heinous,
despicable, and morally reprehensible crime. At a young and
impressionable age, his father robbed him of his childhood with
repeated acts of sexual abuse.127  "This kind of offense is an
offense that is shocking and repulsive to a civilized society.
' 128
No words could adequately capture society's outrage to such
inexcusable and perverse behavior.
Notwithstanding the tragedy that McBroom endured, he
nevertheless pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the crime of
possession of child pornography. 29  What is at issue is not Mc-
Broom's culpability.3 ° That has already been established. Rather
what must be determined is the appropriate sentence that his
conviction warrants according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
One of the primary goals of the sentencing guidelines is to
impose a sentence based on the crime, not the offender.'31
124. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 551.
125. See United States v. McBroom, 991 F. Supp. 445, 447 (D.N.J. 1998); see also Jerry
DeMarco, Sentence Reduced in Net Porn Case, RECORD (N.J.), Jan. 14, 1998, at A2.
126. See McBroom, 991 F. Supp. at 449-50 (recognizing the need for a custodial sentence
to serve as a deterrent to others).
127. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 539 (noting that the sexual abuse that McBroom endured
began when he was four or five years old and continued until he reached the age of 15).
128. United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1991) (Appendix).
129. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 534.
130. "Culpability" is defined as "[b]lameworthiness. Except in cases of absolute liability,
a person's criminal culpability requires a showing that he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require with respect to each material element of the
offense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 379 (6th ed. 1990); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(1).
131. See Vela, 927 F.2d at 199; see also United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218,
reh'g denied, 868 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989).
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Therefore, although it is clear that McBroom indeed suffered from
the traumatic, recurring sexual abuse at the hands of his father, this
does not alter the fact that he committed a crime nor is it, in and
of itself, determinative of the appropriate sentence.'32  The
sentencing court must administer the applicable sentence in
compliance with the guidelines,'33 unless the particular facts and
circumstances are exceptional in degree to warrant a departure.134
Section 5K2.13 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines implicitly
provides a measure of leniency for defendants who commit crimes
as a result of their significantly reduced mental capacity.'35 As
courts of various jurisdictions have repeatedly recognized, "[l]enity
is appropriate because the purpose of [section] 5K2.13 is to treat
with some compassion those in whom a reduced mental capacity
has contributed to the commission of a crime.', 136 No individual
would argue that McBroom's case is undeserving of societal
compassion and empathy. Nor does this comment purport to
discount McBroom's continued personal suffering. Rather, it is the
Third Circuit's unsettled expansion of the existing sentencing
guidelines that this comment calls into question.
Under the facts of McBroom's case, the guidelines do not
permit a downward departure from the applicable guideline based
on the "diminished capacity" policy statement. 37 Determining
the appropriate sentence for a criminal defendant who petitions the
court for a downward departure on the basis that the defendant
suffered from a "significantly reduced mental capacity,', 3' does
not, as the Third Circuit concluded, include an inquiry into the
defendant's volition. Rather the inquiry is limited to the defen-
dant's cognitive impairment. 39 Consequently, as the district court
132. See Vela, 927 F.2d at 199 (explaining that while the facts describing the sexual abuse
experienced by the defendant in Vela are "egregious," they in no way diminish the extent
of the defendant's criminal conduct or determine the appropriate sentence for her conduct,
rather the facts are of the type that are "not ordinarily relevant" under § 5H1.3 of the
sentencing guidelines).
133. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt A.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
135. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446,
1454 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
136. Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1511.
137. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.13, p.s.
138. Id.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 17; see also United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir.
1993) (declining to depart under § 5K2.13, p.s. because there was no indication that Johnson
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correctly concluded, because McBroom was not cognitively
impaired at the time of the offense, he was ineligible for such a
departure from the applicable guideline."
Despite McBroom's admitted ability to absorb information in
the usual way and exercise the power of reason at the time of the
offense, he contended that his uncontrollable compulsion was a
relevant factor that the sentencing court should have considered,
and the Third Circuit agreed.'41 However, an examination of the
plain language of the Sentencing Reform Act, the legislative history
leading up to the Comprehensive Crimes Control Act, and an
exploration of relevant case law indicate that Congress implicitly
rejected volition as a relevant factor at all stages of the criminal
proceeding.
A. The Sentencing Reform Act
A plain reading of the Sentencing Reform Act clearly defines
the distinct roles of the Sentencing Commission and the courts.'42
In determining whether the Commission adequately considered a
particular circumstance, sentencing courts are limited to an
assessment of the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and
official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.'43 On the
contrary, when a question arises as to whether the guidelines take
into consideration a given factor, the proper authority to consult is
the Sentencing Commission, not the individual judges.'" As the
Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Koon,4 5 Congress
commanded the establishment of the Sentencing Commission
specifically for that purpose.'" Congress empowered the Com-
mission to oversee the courts' application of the guidelines and to
review and refine them when necessary.147  In effect, Congress
was unable to process information or to reason); United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190,
192 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (declining to depart under § 5K2.13, p.s. because the
defendant was able to absorb information in the usual way and exercise the power of
reason).
140. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 534.
141. See id. at 544.
142. See supra notes 48-93 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
144. See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2050-51 (1996) (discussing the fact that
Congress instructed the Commission not the court, to "review and revise" the guidelines
periodically).
145. 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
146. See id. at 2050-51.
147. See id. at 2051.
[Vol. 102:3
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
usurped the judges' discretionary power and granted it to the
Sentencing Commission. An alternative view, that the courts may
exercise discretion and unilaterally revise the guidelines, frustrates
the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act in general and the
guidelines in particular.'48
Revising the diminished capacity grounds for downward
departure by factoring in a defendant's volition, 4 9 the Third
Circuit circumvented the proper procedures as mandated by
Congress. The proper procedure for courts to follow is to submit
all petitions for revisions or clarification of the guidelines to the
Sentencing Commission. The Third Circuit exceeded its discretion-
ary boundaries when it created a new standard for "significantly
reduced mental capacity.' 15°  A defendant's volition is not a
factor of the diminished capacity grounds for a downward depar-
ture in sentencing as articulated in section 5K2.13 and thus should
not have been considered. The Third Circuit's decision resurrects
the pre-guideline policies of discretionary sentencing and thwarts
the overall purposes of the guidelines. 5'
Therefore, since the Third Circuit was not authorized to alter
the existing guidelines, McBroom was not entitled to a downward
departure. His sentence should remain unchanged 52 pending a
determination by the Sentencing Commission as to whether the
"significantly reduced mental capacity" policy statement contains
a volitional element.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history leading up to the Sentencing Reform
Act is void of any language explicitly addressing the significance of
a defendant's volition at the sentencing phase.'53 However, it is
significant that Congress expressly rejected a defendant's impaired
volition as a defense at the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding by
eliminating it from the Insanity Defense.'54 The legislative
148. See supra notes 66-68.
149. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 547-49 (3d Cir. 1997) (interpreting the
"diminished capacity" ground for downward departure broadly and adding a volitional prong
to the standard for the "significantly reduced mental capacity" portion).
150. See id.
151. See supra notes 66-68.
152. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 537 (recognizing that McBroom's original sentence was
15-months).
153. See generally S. REP. No. 98-473, at 222 (1983).
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); see also S. REP. No. 98-473, at 222.
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history surrounding the promulgation of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act evidences Congress' vehement objection to an analysis
of a defendant's ability to exercise self-control.' Congress
emphatically concluded that an inquiry into a defendant's volition
is imprecise and unanswerable1 16 or answerable only by "moral
guesses."'5 7  Furthermore, Congress noted that an attempt to
distinguish between a defendant who cannot adhere to the
requirements of the law and a defendant who will not conform is
merely speculative.'58 Such an inquiry inevitably subjects triers
of fact to the unreliable task of assessing the credibility of expert
witnesses159 and the sympathies that necessarily flow from a
situation such as that which McBroom endured.
As evidenced by the unambiguous language in the legislative
history,160 Congress unequivocally rejected volition as a factor in
determining a defendant's mens rea'6' by eliminating volition from
its formulation of the Insanity Defense. 62 It is therefore doubtful
that Congress intended to inject a defendant's ability to exercise
self-control as a factor for consideration in the subsequently
promulgated Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Such an inference is
untenable.
Unlike the Insanity Defense, the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines did not exist prior to the Sentencing Reform Act.63 When
Congress enacted the Insanity Reform Act as part of the Compre-
hensive Crimes Control Act, it modified the existing standard for
the insanity defense by abandoning self-control as a factor of
consideration."6  Contemporaneously, Congress created the
United States Sentencing Commission 65 to formulate the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.'66 Therefore, it necessarily follows that
Congress intended to abolish volition from all phases of a criminal
proceeding. A contrary inference, that Congress intended to
155. See generally S. REP. No. 98-473, at 222.
156. See id. at 227.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1997).
160. See S. REP. No. 98-473, at 222.
161. See id. at 225.
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
163. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-85; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1984).
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 17.
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984).
166. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at Ch. 1, pt. A.
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obliterate volition from the Insanity Defense and simultaneously
introduce it into a separate, later phase of the criminal proceeding
is antithetical to the stated purposes of the criminal law and more
particularly, to the stated purposes of the Sentencing Guide-
lines.
1 67
Proponents of the reinstated M'Naghten Rule for the Insanity
Defense contend that the objectives of the criminal law are better
served by a test that centers on a defendant's cognitive capacity
rather than a defendant's volition."6  A standard excusing only
those criminals that are incapable of self-restraint from committing
a crime as a result of an inability to reason furthers one of the
goals sought by the criminal law, namely deterrence.1 69  A rule
seeking to exculpate criminals who know what they are doing and
are capable of reasoning but lack self-control is contradictory to
that end. 7° The criminal defendant who lacks will-power, unlike
the insane, is at least arguably capable of exercising control over his
or her behavior. The criminal law threatens those individuals with
punishment in an effort to deter them from acting upon those
compulsions. t7'
C. Interpretation of 'Diminished Capacity' in other Circuits
The rule that the McBroom court adopted has been implicitly
rejected by the other circuit courts since the Sentencing Guidelines,
and in particular section 5K2.13, were promulgated over a decade
ago. 72  Taken together, the necessary interpretation that Con-
gress intended to abandon volition at all stages of the criminal
proceeding and the fact that the courts historically have limited
their focus to the cognitive component of a criminal defendant's
mens rea, support the proposition that the Third Circuit miscon-
strued the "significantly reduced mental capacity" standard. The
expansive standard that the Third Circuit adopted is unfounded and
at odds with precedent.
167. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
168. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 34, at 318.
169. See id.
170. See id.(stating that it is "safe" to exempt from punishment those who did not know
what they were doing, for such individuals are not deterrable and may be exculpated without
diminishing the pressure on ordinary men to conform with the law).
171. See id. (stating that fundamental to the goal of deterrence is that "it is essential to
maintain the threat" so long as there is any chance that the preventative influence [of the
criminal law] may operate).
172. See supra note 136.
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The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly rejected the interpretation
adopted by the Third Circuit in McBroom.73 In United States v.
Hamilton,74 the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute. 175  The district
court declined to depart downward from the guidelines on the
grounds that the defendant suffered from a diminished capacity
under section 5K2.13.'76 Expressing doubt as to its authority to
deviate from the guidelines as applied to the facts of the case, the
district court declined to authorize departure.177  The district
court believed that "they [the Sentencing Commission] were talking
about things such as borderline mental intelligence capac-
ity ... [not] about suffering from a compulsive gambling. 1 78
Adopting the cognitive standard for significant reduced mental
capacity, the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that the defendant's
gambling disorder did not cause him to suffer a significantly
reduced mental capacity, as he was able to absorb information in
the usual way and to exercise the power of reason. 7 9
Following its decision in Hamilton, the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Johnson8 ° limited its consideration to the application of
the cognitive standard.18' In Johnson, the defendant pleaded
guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges of bank and mail
fraud.'82 The district court granted the defendant's motion for
downward departure based on his diagnosis of "Severe Adjustment
173. See United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(holding that departure under § 5K2.13 is unavailable when a defendant was able to absorb
information in the usual way and exercise the power of reason); see also United States v.
Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that downward departure under § 5K2.13
was unavailable where it was determined that the defendant, who demonstrated above
average mental agility in his professional affairs, was able to process information and to
reason).
174. 949 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
175. See id. at 191.
176. See id. (arguing that his compulsive gambling evidenced his diminished mental
capacity, the defendant, Dr. Hamilton, and three expert witnesses offered medical reports
and expert testimony in support of the defendant's position to no avail).
177. See id. at 192.
178. Id.
179. See Hamilton, 949 F.2d at 193 (emphasizing that the defendant resorted to selling
drugs because he needed the money, not because he was unable to understand).
180. 979 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1992).
181. See id. at 401.
182. See id. at 397.
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Disorder."183 Finding that the facts did not present a sufficiently
unusual situation to warrant a departure, the Sixth Circuit vacated
the district court's finding and remanded the case for resentenc-
ing.184 There was no indication that Johnson, similar to the
defendant in Hamilton, was unable to reason or process informa-
tion. 185 To the contrary, Johnson exhibited mental agility in both
his professional and personal affairs."8 Consequently, the court
expressed its apprehension in extending the standard, stating that
it would be "ill-advised" to excuse a defendant merely because he
suffered hardship.187  The court feared that a contrary ruling
"would entitle virtually every defendant to a downward departure,
since an inescapable aspect of human existence is misfortune or
defeat.'
188
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Goossens,89 con-
formed to the cognitive standard articulated by the Sixth Cir-
cuit."' In Goossens, a case strikingly similar to McBroom, the
defendant pleaded guilty to knowing possession of child pornogra-
phy. 9' The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's downward departure based on the defendant's alleged
significantly reduced mental capacity."g The court reasoned that
there was no evidence to support a conclusion that the defendant
was unable to process information or to reason. 93 The psycho-
logical report concluded that Goossens was suffering from Axis I
183. See id. at 400 (explaining that the district court's finding was based on Dr. Cooper's
testimony that Johnson suffered from Severe Adjustment Disorder: "a mental condition
brought on by an identifiable psycho-social stressor."). Dr. Cooper posited that the
particular stressor present in Johnson's situation was the receipt of a letter which stated that
the cabin Johnson had just purchased was over his property line. See id. Dr. Cooper
testified that Johnson's "very-perfectionistic" personality was "very compatible with high
levels of achievement in business" and rendered him unable to deal with emotion. See id.
184. See id. at 401.




189. 84 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 1996).
190. See id. at 701.
191. See id. at 698 (explaining that Michael Goossens pleaded guilty to one count of
knowing possession of three or more materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B)).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 701.
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"Dysthymic Disorder" 194 and a "General Anxiety Disorder, ,
195
but never suggested that these disorders impaired "the formation
of reasoned judgments. 1 96  Furthermore, the court recognized
that the remainder of the evidence demonstrated that Goossen had
an above-average mental capacity.97
Other Circuits followed the decisions and reasoning expressed
by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits until recently when the Third Circuit
adopted its own, rather expansive, test for "significant reduced
mental capacity."'198
Historically, when making the determination as to whether a
defendant suffers from a significantly reduced mental capacity,
sentencing courts have placed great weight on psychological
analysis, psychiatric reports, and supporting expert testimony.199
Also of importance has been the existence of any evidence that
demonstrated the defendant's ability to function in other aspects of
his or her life.2°0 While not in-and-of-itself determinative, a
defendant's contention that he or she suffers from a "diminished
capacity" is potentially weakened if the evidence shows that the
defendant exhibited an above-average mental capacity.
194. See Goosens, 84 F.3d at 701. (explaining that Axis I "Dysthymic Disorder" is a form
of anxiety disorder).
195. See id.
196. Id. at 701.
197. See id. (stating that Goossens held a responsible employment position and was aware
of his illegal conduct as shown by his behavior of encrypting the pornographic material to
avoid detection); see also United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(concluding evidence indicating that defendant's offense required extensive planning and that
defendant had exercised sound judgment in other matters was sufficient to support a finding
by the district court that defendant did not suffer from a reduced mental capacity).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1282 (1997) (disallowing downward departure for a defendant who was fully
capable of following complex instructions to transport heroin to the United States, since the
defendant failed to demonstrate that her depression rendered her unable to process
information or to reason); see also United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1367 (D.C. Cir.
1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1437 (1997) (holding that absent an inability to reason,
psychological or behavior disorders could not serve as a basis for departure on the grounds
of reduced mental capacity, and rejecting an interpretation that "mental capacity" has a
meaning other than intellectual capacity); United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 831
(6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that a defendant is determined to suffer from diminished mental
capacity if the ability of the defendant to process information or to reason is affected).
199. See United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Goossens,
84 F.3d at 701.
200. See Johnson, 979 F.2d at 401 (noting that defendant Johnson exhibited "mental
agility" in both his personal and professional affairs); see also Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1346
(explaining that defendant's alleged diminished mental capacity did not keep her from
exercising sound financial judgment when it came to her own finances).
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Despite McBroom's unfortunate history of abuse, his constant
bouts with alcohol, drugs, pornography, and his failed attempts at
rehabilitation, he was nevertheless not crippled by them.2 °1 In
fact, McBroom exhibited above-average intelligence and compe-
tence in the face of adversity. McBroom's unfettered appetite for
success propelled him to obtain both a bachelors degree and a law
degree.2"2  Furthermore, upon graduation from law school,
McBroom clerked for a judge for one year and subsequently
secured employment from three law firms before becoming a sole
practitioner.0 3 McBroom's mental capacity did not hamper his
ability to exercise sound judgment in the professional setting as he
performed to the firms' satisfaction2" and managed a large
amount of demanding work.20 5
Relevant, although not conclusive, is the fact that McBroom
performed an array of complicated tasks on his personal computer.
Specifically, McBroom gained access to the Internet, viewed
pictures of child pornography, and ultimately stored the porno-
graphic images on the hard drive of his computer.206 A combina-
tion of McBroom's behavior and skill demonstrates that he was a
competent man and lawyer who under the pre-existing standard
was not entitled to a downward departure based on significantly
reduced mental capacity. His ability to process information and to
reason was well documented.2 7 Consequently, the Third Circuit
adopted a more lenient standard to justify its interpretation of the
guidelines and to provide a defense for defendants such as Kenneth
McBroom.
The lenient standard adopted by the Third Circuit arguably
creates a new loophole in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It is
well-settled that a defendant who wishes to take advantage of the
201. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 534-37 (3d Cir. 1997).
202. See id. at 535.
203. See id. at 535-36.
204. See id. at 536 (stating that McBroom "never received any complaints from any of
the attorneys for whom [he] did work, and in fact was being asked to handle an increasingly
large volume and variety of matters including closings, motions, depositions, brief-writing and
actual trial work").
205. See id. (noting that McBroom handled approximately sixty-five active litigation files
[and] had approximately seven or eight completed jury trial during this period).
206. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 536-37; see also United States v. Grossens, 84 F.3d 697,
701 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding it relevant that Goossens held a responsible employment position
and was conscious enough of the illegality of his conduct to encrypt the pornographic
material on his computer to avoid detection).
207. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 534.
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McBroom decision must still withstand a number of obstacles. 8
For example, Federal Sentencing Guidelines prohibit the use of the
"diminished capacity" defense when the defendant has committed
a violent crime' or when the judge finds the existence of a
public risk such that incarceration is required.210  A defendant's
"diminished capacity" must also be "significant" in order for the
defense to apply.211 However, once the obstacles are overcome,
application of the defense will still be unwarranted in many
instances, such as in the case of Kenneth McBroom.
Admittedly, the determination as to whether a defendant
suffers from a cognitive impairment is somewhat subjective.
Various doctors and specialists are employed by both the govern-
ment and defense counsel to perform tests on the defendant in an
effort to muster conclusive evidence as to whether the defendant
was able to absorb information in the usual way or employ the
power of reason.212 More often than not, the opposing doctors
differ in their conclusions and the attorneys poke holes in the
opposing side's testimony while simultaneously discounting their
credibility.213  However, despite their differing analyses and
conclusions, the doctors are, at least, qualified to assess the
cognitive faculties of a particular defendant.214 This is not neces-
sarily the case with respect to a defendant's volition.
Determining the status of a defendant's volition requires the
trier-of-fact and sentencing courts, in their fact-finding capacity, to
perform a pattern of guesswork.215 Opposing sides will present
evidence supporting or refuting the defendant's ability to conform
to the law, leaving the ultimate decision to the trier-of-fact who can
only speculate as to the severity of the defendant's situation.21 6
Due to the illusive nature of the "capacity to conform" test, judges
208. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.13, p.s.; see also McBroom, 124
F.3d at 548-49.
209. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.13, p.s.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996).
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See S. REP. No. 98-473, at 222 (1983).
216. See Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371 (recognizing the persuasive tactics of a skillful lawyer who




will inevitably differ in their conclusions. 217  Consequently, the
field of criminal law will witness a return to the pre-guideline era
of discretionary sentencing.21 Such a result is precisely what the
guidelines were promulgated to abolish.
Furthermore, it is likely that the use of the "diminished
capacity" defense with a volitional prong will become a "boiler-
plate" defense. 19 Inevitably, criminal defense attorneys will
argue that the defendant was unable to control his or her behavior
and conform to the law, in the hopes that the presiding judge is a
sympathetic believer in the volition defense. Defense attorneys will
be encouraged to "comb" the defendant's history for evidence of
adversity and childhood neglect.22° Such searches will almost
always prove to be successful because adversity necessarily
accompanies the journey of life.221 In effect, any defendant who
could point to a sufficient tragic event encountered in life will be
eligible for a sentencing reduction.222 Arguably, any defendant
who comes before the court can rely on the defense, because
misfortune and defeat are inescapable aspects of human exis-
tence.223  Thus, as the courts have feared, the "volition defense"
will become a boilerplate defense in a criminal trial when the
defendant committed a non-violent offense. Such behavior thwarts
the stated purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act and culminates
in a "resurrect[ion] of the pre-guidelines regime, 24 of discretion-
ary sentencing.
VIII. Conclusion
An examination of the Sentencing Reform Act, the legislative
history surrounding the Comprehensive Crimes Control Act, and
217. See S. REP. NO. 98-473, at 222.
218. See Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371.
219. See United States v. Harpst, 949 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1991) (borrowing the words
of Judge Jones, who found that a rule permitting downward departures on the basis of the
defendant's alleged self-destructive tendencies was ill-advised because the court feared that
such a rule result in suicide claims becoming boilerplate in defendants' arguments before
sentencing judges); see also United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 400-01 (6th Cir. 1993).
220. See Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371.
221. See United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1282 (1997) (noting that setting a low threshold for diminished capacity creates incen-
tives for defendants to comb their personal histories to find evidence of misfortune and
explaining that adversity and neglect are especially present in the lives of criminals).
222. See id.
223. See Johnson, 979 F.2d at 401.
224. Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371.
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case law, demonstrates that the Third Circuit erroneously expanded
the "diminished capacity" factor beyond its intended meaning.
Contrary to the decision reached in McBroom, Congress did not
intend to provide a defense for the defendant who lacked self-
control. Such an interpretation, should it become widespread,
would inevitably result in the "diminished capacity" defense
becoming a boilerplate defense whenever a defendant commits a
non-violent offense. Thus, the courts would be required to perform
a guessing game of sorts. Similar to the pre-guideline practices, the
sentence a defendant received would depend largely on the
courtroom in which the defendant was sentenced. Consequently,
the judicial system would witness the resurrection of discretionary
sentencing, which is precisely what Congress sought to eradicate in
passing the Sentencing Reform Act.
Kelly A. Herten
